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INTRODUCTION

It has been stated that power is to the study of international relations what money is to the study of economics, a means to an end.[1] If one accepts this idea, then an approach to the study of contemporary world politics is immediately suggested. In such an approach, power would be taken as the constant in which both means and ends would be measured and compared; other elements such as ideology would be considered as variables. Ideology fits this technique of analysis well since it is usually present in some form and differences in the content of ideologies seem to be related to differences in the power relationship of nations in the contemporary world. The examination of the relative importance and interrelation of ideology and power will be accomplished in three steps. First, those areas of the world where the same or similar ideologies exist will be clarified and named. The types of ideology and power in these blocs will be considered here. Second, the relationship of ideology and power within the blocs themselves will be examined. Third, the interrelation between the blocs, their ideologies and their relative power will be examined as part of the conclusion.

The choice of ideology as a variable and power as a constant is not limited to Wolfers. Stoessinger states that ideology serves the peculiar function of justifying power and transforming it into authority.[2] Morgenthau also advocates this type of concept of the relation between ideology and

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1 Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore, 1962, pg. 105
2 Stoessinger, The Might of Nations, New York, 1961, pg. 28

power. "Ideology renders involvement in the contest for power psychologically and morally acceptable to the actors as well as the audience."[3] From the writings of such authors, one can see that there has already been much consideration of the interrelationship of ideology and power in international relations. What has been done though is more along the line of pragmatic attempts to devise workable approaches to international affairs so as to facilitate the finding of solutions to current and future foreign affairs problems. This may be considered as a technician's approach vice that of a scholar. This is not to say that the approach of such persons is not thorough and analytical, but rather that the terms in which these approaches are couched are designed to facilitate their use, upon completion, by others. The audience for which these works are directed include politicians, diplomats, ideologues (activist intellectuals) and students. Whether these students are destined to be scholars or technicians is a moot point. The greatest shortcoming from which studies of this type suffer is that of personal value and goal judgments by the author. This is not to condemn value and goal orientations by authors, but rather to stress that in any work in which this is present one must be alert to understand the authors orientation and make appropriate allowances for it. The simplest test for works of this type is found in the conclusion. The presence here of recommendations for action and desirous predictions is a good indication that personal values have played some role in the interpretation of material used in the preceding work.

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[3] Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 86-88

Daniel Bell has defined the difference between the scholar and the intellectual in the following manner. The scholar has occupied himself in a limited field of work, and within this field seeks to discover facts which can add to the total knowledge of the field in a manner similar to additions to an existing mosaic. The non-scholarly intellectual is self interested, or oriented, and deals with self thoughts, perceptions and privileges.[4] Thus, while much has already been written about the role of power and ideology in international relations, the majority of the works examined seems to have been written with the aim of finding solutions or making predictions. The presence of some political ideology in everyone is a point which must be considered in the review of all studies of power and ideology as well as in the process of a study itself. For if ideology is always present, it must be a factor in all political actions regardless of the extent to which power alone may appear to be the predominate factor. Thus, a partial conclusion may be stated prior to the body of the study: ideology in some form and degree is always an element in world politics. The question is, how great is its role and how do changes in the ideology of a period, or a political group, relate to the power aspects of that period or group?

TERMS AND CONCEPTS TO BE USED IN THIS ESSAY

POWER: Power in international affairs is of the same nature as in other areas of politics. In its broadest sense, and the one most generally

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[4] Bell, The End of Ideology, New York, 1960, pg. 372

ascribed to, Lasswell and Kaplan say, "Power is a form of influence which is special in that the threat of sanctions (or their use) to force a specific form of action is threatened or used."[5] Lasswell and Kaplan go on to say that power must be viewed as a value itself as well as in terms of the objectives of the user. It may also be separate from the actual field in which it operates, as in the case of labor union power over productive capital.[6]

The definitions of the term power cover a continuum from the above broad usage through areas where it is divided into pervasive and coercive[7], to the other extreme where power in international affairs is defined solely in terms of the military and industrial potential which can be focused on opponents as a coercive force to insure their compliance with the wishes of the stronger actor.[8]

In an exasperated manner one could say that power is whatever the speaker defines it to be. The speaker need not be consistent either so long as the term is redefined with each variant use. One aspect of the term on which there is agreement though is that power has the effect of influencing the behavior of others irrespective of the exact means used. In world politics there is generally more of the coercive force aspect of power present than in most domestic affairs. This seems to be due to the availability of other influencing devices such as economic, legal and social sanctions, which are not present in the same respect in world politics.

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5 Lasswell & Kaplan, Power and Society, London, 1952, pg. 76
6 Lasswell & Kaplan, Power and Society, London, 1952, pg. 77
7 Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore, 1962, pp. 103-105
8 Claude, Power and International Relations, New York, 1962, pp. 3-5

Though the end result of influencing others is the same in both domestic and international power, the form which power takes in these areas is different. In the domestic sphere, it is authority. In the international area, it is prestige.[9] This difference between the form of internal and external power provides one basis for the qualification of power as either legitimate or illegitimate. In the internal sphere, the question of legitimacy revolves around the ability to achieve consent without a resort to force. In the international relations sphere this criterion is not applicable. The ability to force consent in international relations may rest with any country which has sufficient power. To attempt to say when this is legitimate is a moot point. The question of legitimacy in international power could only be considered in terms of the relation, or similarity, between the ideologies of the nations involved. In other words if the ideologies were similar, then the influence of the country which gained consent might be called legitimate power (or prestige).

IDEOLOGY: Ideology like power covers a wide spectrum of meanings which depend as much on the user as on the circumstance in which they are used. In a general definition, Apter has listed ideology as something more than doctrine. "It links particular actions and mundane practices with a wider set of meanings, and by doing so lends a more honorable and dignified complexion to social conduct."[10] In a more detailed but not specific tone

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[9] Niebuhr, "Power and Ideology in National and International Affairs", Fox, T. R., ed., Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, Notre Dame, 1959, pg. 108

[10] Apter, Ideology and Discontent, New York, 1964, pg. 16

there is the definition by Brzezinski. "It is essentially an action program suitable for mass consumption, derived from certain doctrinal assumptions about the general nature of the dynamics of social reality, and combining some assertions about the inadequacies of the past and/or present with some explicit guides to action for improving the situation and some notions of the desired eventual state of affairs."[11] In a most specific sense, and the one which unless otherwise stated will be used in this study, Ernst Haas has defined ideology in the following manner. "A set of propositions, more or less (in some respect) logically interrelated, about what society is and what it should become. It is usually advanced by a political actor (though not necessarily) of some kind. The purpose of the advancement of these propositions is to advocate some state in the future or action which would lead to this state. A set of propositions of this type are the product of an actor and not a detached observer, who would develop what would more correctly be called a theory. The advocacy involved in the propositions must contain a commitment or intention to act."[12]

In Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim sees ideology as either particular or total.[13] In this sense it will be the total Mannheimian concept of ideology which we are dealing with when referring to the ideologies of the three world power blocs later in the study.

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[11] Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics, New York, 1962, pp. 4-5

[12] This was taken from the 11 Feb lecture, 1965, by Ernst Haas. The meaning but not the wording are as stated in the lecture.

[13] Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, New York, 1936, pp. 55-56

NATIONAL MYTH: This is a creed or set of beliefs accepted by a whole society as defining its way of life. Members must perceive the myth for it to be relevant. If an observer sees it as existing but the people are not aware of it, it is not a part of the myth. An existing myth may have been an ideology in an earlier time before it became the test for an established, ongoing organization. The dividing line between when a set of beliefs is a myth or an ideological base for action is very vague. When referring to the non-Communist Western bloc the two terms can, and are, used interchangeably.

THEORY: A theory is the sole property of an observer and may exist exclusively of what the actor may think or perceive. It is most generally based on the actual behavior of the actors as seen by the observer and any ideology which is observed is that of the total Mannheimian sense.

MORAL-ETHIC: This term refers to the goals of stability, justice and freedom. It is nominally present in all three blocs. The moral-ethic differs from myth mainly in that the people may not be aware of these goals as the ends of socio-political action. The relative importance of these three goals varies within the blocs as does the age of the goals as a moral ethic in the blocs. Niebuhr traces the active drive for these goals as being four centuries old in the Western bloc. The Communist ideology is a reaction to the failure of the West to achieve them rapidly enough. The non-aligned bloc came into being with these goals as part of their ideology.[14]

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[14] Niebuhr, Op. Cit., pp. 108-110

BALANCE OF POWER: This term is generally felt to have its origins in the absolutist period in Europe. Since that time it has been one of the most used and abused terms in international affairs. In addition to being used as a multiple meaning concept of international affairs, it has also been used as a prescription and as a propaganda device.[15] There are two common conceptual uses of balance of power. One is a situation of equality (which may be stable or unstable) in which neither side or sides are in sufficient possession of enough power to dominate the others and a stalemate results. The second concept of the balance of power is both more in the classical sense and more misunderstood. It is that system in which England of the 18-19th century period was considered as holding a balance of power. In this concept what was meant was that the power of the other European powers was such that regardless of how they aligned themselves, England had sufficient power to determine the outcome of actual or potential conflicts by aligning herself with the otherwise weaker side. The purpose of such a situation was to discourage conflict by having enough power to deter potential aggressors from action.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY: This system is the modern equivilant of the older balance of power which aims at amassing enough strength to deter a potential aggressor. In addition to being viewed as a modern form of the balance of power, collective security is also seen by some as the forerunner of world government.[16] In general though it appears as a transitory situation also in

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15 Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda", in Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York, 1961

16 Claude, Power and International Relations, New York, 1962, pp. 273-288

to the temporary alliances of the past with some possible trappings of federated forms of government.

NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM: These two terms are heard today almost ad nauseam in descriptions of the trends of countries and blocs. The intent of any speaker is what determines in which context he is using the terms. Nationalism has been summed up briefly as, "The acceptance of the state as the impersonal and ultimate arbiter of human affairs."[17] When an actor describes nationalism, it generally seems to take the form of a socio-political value or myth. When advocacy or action are involved, nationalism then becomes an ideology. Nationalism can also be a theory when used by the outside observer to describe a circumstance or series of events in an area. The multifarious aspects of nationalism seem to almost demand the earlier terse definition if one hopes to get a concept compact enough to deal with other than the most specific types of considerations. The many controversies which center around nationalism are mostly concerned with why it occurs in the forms which it does in the places where it does. What it is, seems to be of less concern to most discussants, and most would probably be hard pressed to agree on its definition. For this reason, there appears to be little harm done in our abbreviated approach. The why and where are also more under consideration here than the what.

Imperialism does not lend itself to brief summation. The differences between what is called imperialism today and what was imperialism in the

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[17] Silvert, Expectant Peoples, New York, 1963, pg. 19

19th century is still not clear. Other theories about power as the cause of imperialism or the Communist theory of the need to export surplus capital have recently been challenged by the social behavioralist approach of social scientists. Imperialism in its broadest sense is the exploitation of one people by another.[18] Included in such a broad definition are all the various reasons for exploitation be they social, economic, political or racial. In a somewhat more classical line, Strachey has defined imperialism as a "successful attempt to subjugate a people with the intent of ruling them for an indefinite period."[19] In modern times there has been an attempt away from the subjugation aspects of imperialism and more of a condemnation on exploitation, preferably without the outward appearance of such. This desire to avoid the stigma of being labeled as an imperialist has led to the use of more subtle forms of control. The surging nationalism among the new countries of the world now makes even this more discrete approach difficult.

STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

The final concept to be defined is that of the functional structural approach to socio-political analysis. This approach, while still not completely systemized, does provide another way of viewing socio-political change where societal operations are the basis for investigation vice power, ideology, etc. Structures as referred to in this system are any patterns

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[18] Strachey, The End of Empire, New York, 1959, pg. 319
[19] Ibid., pg. 319

which are a standard feature of a society. Functions are any consequence of a structure of which it is a part, they must be functional for some on going goal. The key aspects of this concept which are most important in this discussion are the basic stages of social change: traditional transitional and modern. The basis of this approach to social change revolves around the observation that in the traditional society there are relatively few structures, but each of them performs many functions, i.e., the family in a peasant society which performs many functions. In modern society, there are many structures each of which is functionally specific, i.e., the family in modern society is now the base for very few social operations outside child raising. (Chart 1)

The manner to be used in exploring the question of the relation of ideology and power is contemporary world politics will use the above terms and concepts. The relation and importance of power, ideology, myth, nationalism and imperialism will be discussed both in terms of their use within the three blocs of the present world alignment, and their effect on and reaction to one another as a result of interaction between these blocs. There will be an obvious tendency to emphasize major points of world power and ideology and a consequent slighting of the more detailed material in most areas. This tendency to generalize, results from the aim to find some overall pattern if one exists rather than minute case explanations which are not broadly applicable.

AREAS OF BLOCS OF IDEOLOGICAL SIMILARITY

Just as Gaul was divided into three parts, so the world today may be said to be divided into three blocs. The unifying aspect of these blocs,

as well as the main difference between them, are their respective ideologies. The three blocs referred to here are: the non-Communist West, the Communist East and the non-aligned independent countries of the Afro-Asian area. The division of the world into these three blocs does not mean that there is a specific ideology or even or even that ideology in the same sense exist in all three blocs. Likewise, power as earlier defined by Lasswell and Kaplan exists only in the western and eastern blocs. The ability to influence the decisions and actions of others (power) which the non-aligned bloc does possess is of a different form and capacity. It may be likened to the influence which a student driver car has on other more experienced drivers. This has been called, "the paridoxical power of the weak."[20] The ability of Cuba and Albania to influence the actions of other powerful nations is an example of this power of the weak.

Another way of differentiating the three blocs of the present world is along the lines of their structures and functions. Whether one uses the terms traditional, transitional and modern or diffuse, prismatic and refracted the basic aspects of the approach are the same. (See Chart 1) Under such a classification system, the Western non-Communist bloc would fall in the modern (refracted) category. The Communist bloc would be partially in the transitional and partially in the modern section. The non-aligned bloc would most generally be just emerging from the traditional class with some well into the transitional. The diverse nature of social patterns within some of the countries would make exact placement in this

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[20] Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore, 1962, pg. 111

however, difficult. This uneven development could give some scholars fits since two or three charges impossible to point exactly of their socio-political patterns and choosen to target.

Regardless of the position in which a nation might be placed, it would generally be agreed that there is a trend for societies to move from the traditional to the transitional and then to the modern. It should be obvious that at some future time there may develop a stage beyond the present modern one. In light of this the use of the terms diffuse, primarily and refracted are probably more apropos and less susceptable to charges of ethnocentrism. This method of classification is one with which a political actor might take issue; since, he would probably not be aware of it in these terms.

The nature of leadership in these countries is another aspect which parallels functional analysis categories to a remarkable degree. In some respects, it serves as an excellent indicator of the developmental stages of the political patterns of the countries. In the traditional countries, leadership authority rests on the acceptance of the power of the ruler as legitimate because it is in some manner related to the socio-religious patterns of the country. In the transitional period, societies are to some extent dysfunctional and charismatic or totalitarian leaderships may arise. In the modern stage the rational legal type of leadership is most common. There is usually an air of legitimacy in this stage since by its nature the rational-legal concept assumes at least the original support of the masses. The question of legitimcy in the transitional is somewhat

contradictory because both types may or may not have the required mass support to make them legitimate. The apparent legitimate nature of the totalitarian government in communist China is a good example of this.

[illegible]: SIMILAR AND DEVIATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE BLOCS

THE NON-COMMUNIST WEST

The geographic area of this bloc roughly includes North America, Western Europe and Australia. A sphere of political (and to a lesser extent ideological) influence extends further to include South America, Japan and the Philippines. The socio-economic nature of these last three might tend to place them more in the third or non-aligned bloc. While this possibility does exist, the geographic location of South America (less Cuba) and the power events of the last half century point to the inclusion of these three in the western bloc.

While power, as earlier mentioned, has always played a part in the relations of all nations in the West, the variable of ideology has always been considered (due to its emphasis on freedom and justice) as the most important element of both internal and external affairs. The situation today has changed. A condition called "The end of ideology" now exists in the West.[21] In terms of our earlier definition of ideology this premise is based on the apparent disappearance of a mobilizing commitment among the intellectuals of the Western bloc. What has emerged to take the place

[21] Bell, The End of Ideology, New York, 1960, pg. 16

in essence may be called myth. Daniel Bell states it as follows: "Few serious minds any longer believe that one can set down a blueprint for social engineering and bring about a utopia of social harmony....there is a rough consensus among western intellectuals on basic political issues: there is acceptance of the welfare state, the desirability of a decentralized state, a system of mixed economy and political pluralism. Viewed in this light, the age of ideology is dead."[22]

What does this end of ideology mean as far as the Western role in world politics is concerned? The predominant result seems to be a status quo approach to pressures for external change and an accommodating response to internal pressures for change and improvement. Another way of saying this is that the West today does not mobilize or need to mobilize its populations to accomplish sweeping internal changes or evangelical overseas conversion programs. The overseas efforts of the West in the last fifteen years have been basically a continuation of the containment policy advocated by Kennan in 1950.[23] The ideologically mobilized forces of the pre-1941 period are gone. In their place there is a tendency for systems to try and meet demands rather than remain reactionary until they are overwhelmed by the demands of the masses. The effect which this maturation from ideologically based action to myth based action has had on the use and concepts of power is still not fully clear. Power is as present an element today as it was in the past. In some respects it is stronger

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[22] Bell, Ibid., pg. 373
[23] Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, Chicago, 1951, pp. 135-145

of [illegible] to its ability to achieve certain goals in the Third World are concerned. The problem today in the West is not just where, when and how to use power but whether it should be used at all. Even in the West there is a reaction that power, per se is seen as a dirty word and in an even more loaded context. People who do seek to authorize the use of, power are often called war mongers or power politicians. Has this reaction to the use of power been solely caused by the so-called end of ideology? Niebuhr, as earlier mentioned, has equated power with the authority of a government to gain consent without resorting to the use of force. He also relates this authority to power by saying, "If power is identical with authority, it follows that the climate of a culture, or its ideology, which sanctions a particular type of authority, is really the ultimate source of power."[24] Stoessinger supports this relation of ideology and power by saying, "Power in the last analysis must rest on the capacity of physical force. Authority on the other hand obtains similar compliance because it is accepted as legitimate or true. Ideology served the peculiar function of justifying power and transforming it into authority."[25] The conclusion which one may therefore draw from this is, if ideology fades or its goals are generally realized, the authority on which the existing political power had rested must find another legitimating base.

A myth, by its nature, seldom provides the driving type of support needed for goals other than the status quo and the internal accommodation

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[24] Niebuhr, Op. Cit., pg. 108
[25] Stoessinger, Op. Cit., pg. 20

of socio-political problems. Thus, the end of ideology in the West may be said to have removed the ability to mobilize forces which in the past existed. The justification for the use of power as means to ends in world politics has also ceased. In the past, the users of power in the West have always attempted to clothe themselves with some ideological support. Today the physical portion of this power is still present, but the will to use it aggressively in external relations has passed or been curtailed by the end of ideology.

It has also been suggested that the end of ideology is really the end of ideological differences of opinion. This would indicate that the myth of the West today is actually ideology minus its militant commitment to action. In this sense, the interchangeability of the terms ideology and myth is probably clearer. The situation in the Western bloc could then be said to be: that power, while present in greater amounts than ever before is not used as extensively as before due to the ceasing of Western ideology, by the removal of goal and value differences. The replacement of ideology by the moral-ethic of national myths has not provided an adequate substitute base for the justification of traditional power politics.

THE COMMUNIST BLOC

The Communist bloc is comprised of the Soviet Union and the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. The main unifying feature of the bloc is the ideology which holds "the notion of a dynamic evolution towards some

universal utopia.[26] The power-ideology relation in this also may be said to be of the classical type. It is classical in respect to the support which the ideology gives to the use of power. This question of support must be kept in mind when attempting to evaluate the purposes of an ideology. Morgenthau has stated this in a somewhat arbitrary way. "While all politics is necessarily a pursuit of power, ideologies render involvement in that contest for power psychologically and morally acceptable to the actors and their audiences."[27] Thus, while the actual relationship between power and ideology is a multifaced and complex one, it is apparent that the level of belief by the masses in an ideology is what determines the actual power factor.[28]

This raises the question in relation to the Communist bloc as to whether the ideology is a true base for action, a sham front for a dictatorship or a combination of the two which has some validity but at the same time is used as a tool by the leaders to help maintain the fervor of the masses in support of the espoused goals of the movement.

In the West today there is often stated a premise by certain authors that the Communist leaders are tending away from their more doctrinaire Marxist line and becoming pragmatic and somewhat more liberal in their approach to socio-political matter. Brzezinski is quick to dispel this notion and point out that rather than a drift away from ideology, the changes which have occurred as a result of personalities, domestic and

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[26] Stoessinger, Ibid., pg. 27
[27] Morgenthau, Op. Cit., pg. 16-66
[28] Stoessinger, Op. Cit., pg. 20

international situations and environmental necessities have actually made the appeal and validity greater and strengthened its application in certain areas.[29] "It is precisely because the [Soviet] ideology is both a set of conscious assumptions and purposes and part of the total intellectual, social and personal background of the Soviet leaders that it is so pervasive and so important."[30]

This awareness of continuing change in the conditions which surround them as well as their believed understanding of it is one of the main strengthening factors of the Soviet system and its ideology. This is a way of preventing static or unreal approaches from developing and also shows the followers (those which Brzezinski believes) that the ideology must be correct since it has not become obsolete but has been able to satisfactorily weather the ever changing situations in the socio-economic and political realm. An analogy could be made here with a liberal interpretation of, what is considered by some as, an inflexible doctrine in some respects similar to the loose interpretation to which the United States Constitution has been subjected.

In Brzezinski's approach, ideology and power in the Communist bloc are related in the following manner, "Soviet national interest is that which increases the power and capability of the USSR to promote Communism. Communist ideology, therefore, does not raise the dilemma of national versus international objectives....and permits the Soviet leaders to strengthen their power without power becoming the sheer end of their actions. Ideology

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[29] Brzezinski, Op. Cit., pp. 98-99
[30] Brzezinski, ibid., pp. 99

that makes power both a tool and an end allows the Soviet leaders to be continuously concerned with the maintenance of their power without their power becoming an impediment to the fulfillment of theological values.[21]

We may conclude that within the Soviet bloc, Communist ideology translates itself into a factor of power or internal legitimate authority. It also acts as a linking system of values for the entire Communist bloc. This serves the double advantage of reducing the absolute force level required to insure satellite adherence (manpower type variable being more the exception than the rule) by linking their leaders with those of the Soviet Union in such a way as to result in a more or less solid front within the bloc with respect to international affairs.

The Non-Aligned, Neutralist Bloc

The basic geographic limits of this bloc include, the newly emerged Afro-Asian countries, India, the Middle Eastern countries and in the defined terms of this approach, China, Cuba and Yugoslavia. The main reason for including the last three countries in this bloc vice the Communist bloc is their foreign policies. While these three are Communist and totalitarian in internal operation, their foreign affairs are most similar to those of the non-aligned nations. In other words, these countries strive to maintain an independence in world politics as opposed to becoming satellites of either Eastern or Western blocs. China and Cuba seem to have further grandiose plans for becoming the leaders of new or existing regional blocs

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[21] Dresselhuis, Ibid., pp. 108-109

(Asia and South America, respectively). China's present foreign policy indicates that she would like to become the leader of the entire non-aligned bloc, if possible.

The relation of ideology and power in the non-aligned countries is unique because of the lack of absolute power (coercive force) such as exist in the other blocs. This lack of military and industrial capacity is a predominant factor in the international affairs of all these countries. Though China could hardly be called weak, her industrial and military strength relative to other major powers in international affairs is, at present, noticeably less. In those relatively more advanced countries of this bloc, there is still a widespread lack of industrial and military strength. The external relations and policies of these countries are almost totally determined by their internal conditions and the desires of the political elites ruling them.

The interesting point about the ideological component of the power factor in these countries is that while they have a mobilized population, that has fervor and commitment, they have no clearcut social blueprint such as is usually the goal which inspires a commitment to action by the masses. Liska has described this pseudo-ideology as being based on internal economic need and the desire of the political elites to meet these needs while maintaining their personal power by appearing non-subservient to either the old imperialist countries or the Soviet Union.[32] In many cases, the elites of these non-aligned countries are Western educated. This Western education is probably why, though they are not pro-West, they are

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[32] Liska, "The Rastional of Non-Alignment", Neutralism, ed. Wolfers, Washington, D.C., 1961, pg. 80

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selves devoted Communists, even though many have a degree of Marxist affinity. Schram has described this ideology in underdeveloped countries as, "Leninism minus the class struggle."[33] This approach is characterized by an acceptance of certain of Lenin's ideas about Western imperialism but a rejection of the divisive class struggle concept. In place of this, they opt for nationalism because of its mobilizing ability and also because there is an actual lack of classes per se in many of the Afro-Asian countries. In some cases, classes which might have been present in the past ended with the withdrawal of the imperialist country and its personnel. The political action which this pseudo-ideology leads to is a radical liberal democracy (mass movement) where external policy is a servant of internal need. The immediate goal being to get the funds and equipment for domestic projects which without some form of outside help could not be afforded.

One continuing problem which the elites of the non-aligned bloc are dealing with is that of how to remain in control of a mobilized mass which, now that it has been awakened to its condition, desires rapid progress. The rapidity which is sought by the masses is greater than that which can be achieved by internal means alone. Some of their goals in fact are beyond all reasonable ability of rapid fulfillment. The cry for "Uhuru" in Kenya is one such case.

In summing up the situation in the non-aligned bloc, the lack of physical power would probably head the list. The elites face a dilemma of trying to maintain internal stability (plus increasing their legitimacy) while increasing international prestige. The obstacle to this latter drive is the already mentioned lack of power.

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33 Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, New York, 1963, pg. 79

Since neither an ideology nor power in the normal sense exist in the non-aligned bloc, the elites seem to feel that the best way in which to maintain control and at the same time improve the international prestige of their countries is to: not actually align themselves with either side, take all the aid they can get from both sides, maintain an outward attitude of antagonism towards past imperialist countries to keep the masses satisfied, and try and give the appearance that they as non-aligned nations are actually a major third force in the world. They would like to be viewed as the new holder of the balance of power between the East and the West, but their lack of actual power relative to the other two blocs makes this a more distant goal. Their attempts at being the arbitor for the other two blocs have also been generally unsuccessful due to this same lack of power.

The material presented thus far has been an attempt to show that the present world situation is one in which there are three blocs of somewhat related countries. The relation of power and ideology within these blocs is as different as are the natures of the ideologies themselves. There appears little ground at this point to assume that inter-bloc relations might be an extension of intra-bloc relations. To try and find some higher common denominator for understanding the relationship would in all likelihood result in such vague generalities as to preclude any meaningful conclusions.

A narrower approach, such as one which deals with power alone as the sole determinant for all political actions (á la Morgenthau, Claude, etc.) usually fails to account for the underlying goals, values and social causes

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which are the base for the power factor in politics. Such an approach as would use power only has in the past given answers or solutions similar to the law of mass numbers. (This refers to the ability to predict a 50/50 relation between heads and tails if a coin is tossed in the air a sufficient number of times.)[3] The use of power as the base for understanding political action will in many cases give this sort of predictive results and it may also point to steps which if taken may solve some problems. Failure to understand the underlying social causes as well as the future problems which may result from an emphasis solely on power makes this approach rather like a doctor treating the symptoms instead of the disease.

An approach which would attempt to use ideology alone would also be something less than complete. While ideology is an important element of power, it would not be able to account for situations where two countries, or blocs, had an identical ideology but were still opposing each other in a crisis situation.

In view of this inseparable relation between ideology and power, the next section will examine the relative importance and interrelation of each within the three blocs themselves.

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND POWER IN THE WEST

In the West, power at present is more important than ideology due to the default of the latter. The ideology of the West as a driving exportable force has faded. The non-aligned countries, which are the audience for today's Western efforts, generally tend to find the pluralistic, liberal-democratic, capitalist doctrine, and Western governmental forms of operation

too much of a rich country's luxury. Thus, while the elites of the non-aligned countries are for the most Western educated and in some degree adherents of Western moral (political) values, they feel that the internal pressures of their countries do not allow them to follow the patterns of the West. This means that power is the most influencial factor which the West has at its disposal in world politics.

One purpose of the force element of the West's power is that of a counterbalance for the force of the Communist bloc. The stalemate which currently exists in this military arena has tended to drive the competition between the East and West into the ideological and economic area. In this ideological area, the myth of the West, by its Status Quo nature, finds it difficult to compete for the commitments of peoples who want change in rapid sweeping forms. The West therefore tries to keep the struggle in terms of moral values and economic progress. In this area, the Communist "pie in the sky future", is challenged by the more advanced material progress of the West.

The West, internally, can be said to see its ideology (myth) as important, mainly due to the legitimate nature (rational-legal) of the existing Western authority. In external affairs the myth is advocated, but physical and economic power are in reality the most important elements in the influencing of others.

THE COMMUNIST BLOC

In the Communist bloc, the force element is equal to that of the West, but the nature of the ideology is such that it is a true base of power for

both internal and external actions. In addition to its value as a balance against the West, the force element of Communist power, serves as a valuable propaganda device to show the material progress that has been made by the Communists through their socialistic economic and political programs. The revisionist aspect in Communist ideology is not so much a break away from Marxist-Leninist doctrines (as earlier mentioned from Brzezinski) but rather an adaptive process to show that the Communist ideology is both correct in its abstract theory as well as in its applicability to the changing conditions of everyday life (continual change being the Communist conception of Status Quo). Ideological changes are sometimes explained as prior misunderstanding of doctrine rather than as changes in the doctrine itself.

The stalemate which exists between the East and the West in the force area of power results in the Communists relying on the combination of an ideology of the future and economic competition in the present. This then is their basic approach to the current international relations struggle. The portion of the Communist ideology which has the strongest appeal to the non-aligned countries is that of economic policies and programs which can be immediately used by the non-developed and under-developed countries to gain a rapid degree of economic and industrial progress.

The Communists therefore find ideology more important than power in their external affairs. Power as a force against the West is important mainly to provide protection and propaganda. Ideology is the strong point of the Communist policy, both internally and externally. Both its utopian ideals and economic aspects give it an important power factor in maintaining internal authority and building external prestige.

THE NON-ALIGNED BLOC

There is one particular feature about this bloc which is sometimes not realized. This is not a neutralist bloc as it is often referred to. The members of this bloc seek peace not by neutralist non-involvement and supporting ideologies, but rather by specific strategies, i.e., total world disarmament, and foreign policies which advocate steps toward this goal.[34]

In the relation of power and ideology in these countries, the most obvious point that stands out is the almost complete lack of the coercive power element which is found in the other blocs. Absence here is not by choice but due to industrial and technological lag. Power in other forms is present. The first form is that of world opinion. The non-aligned nations are the audience and consumers for which the West and the Communists are competing. Both competitors believe that they will, in the long run, prevail. They feel this impending success in conjunction with a belief that the other side will either change or collapse in the long run. The basis of the interest which the two competing blocs have in the neutral bloc is therefore three fold. First, they seek to help advance them politically, economically and industrially. Second, they seek to show them what they (the competitors) believe to be the correct form of socio-political organizations and institutions. Third, they seek to add them to their side or sphere of influence so that any so-called balance of power in the sense of stability will ultimately be in their (the strongest side) favor.

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[34] Wolfers, Neutralism, Washington, D.C., 1961, pp. 53-54

The other element of power capability possessed by the non-aligned blue nations refers to their ability to create conflict between themselves and/or major powers through irrational behavior. This somewhat negative power to start crises (without being able to resolve or stop them) is one way to influence world politics, influence being used in the sense of the original definition of power.

Ideology, or what the non-aligned elites use for the ideological consumption of the masses, in the non-aligned nations is based on a doctrine of economic development, nationalism and racism. The last item, racism, being a reaction to past colonial experiences where white supremacy was a basic element of imperial control. Another factor which determined the present ideology of the non-aligned nations is the manner in which they emerged and achieved their independence. The Second World War saw the weakening of the actual power of the imperial countries to such a degree that they were not in the total control of their colonies after the war as they were prior to it. In some cases, they were absent during the war period while the Axis nations controlled these areas. Their attempted return after the war was less than strong, both due to their own weakened position and the increased resistance of the local populations. This increased resistance resulted from a changed attitude on the part of the masses. It stemmed from their observation that the imperialists were not invincible as was felt to be the case prior to the war.

The internal event which in most cases sparked the local movements for independence was the return of the native elites from study in the West. In the West these elites had not only acquired an education but a

new set of moral values and goal orientations. The return of these elites created a dysfunction within the colonies by the alteration of the "structure of values" which had kept the local populations subservient to both their local chieftains and the imperialists. These changes in the value structure required that some corresponding changes in the patterns of exploitation take place so as to bring the social system back into synchronization. These changes took the form of movements for nationalism and self-determination.

The mobilization of the masses to accomplish this pattern change was not difficult for the elites to achieve since the oppression and exploitation of the imperialists was a very real thing in the minds of the local populations. Once mobilized, however, the masses were not satisfied to stop with political independence. The goal of economic and political equality with the other nations of the world followed close on the heels of the nationalist movement. This put the elites in a position of also having to become the leaders of these new drives or being by-passed by the movement and perhaps overthrown. The situation of a surfer on the crest of a wave is a good analogy. By taking the lead, one can ride a wave to its end, failure to do so will result in either being left behind in the backwater or being toppled.

The relative position of what is called ideology and power in the non-aligned countries may be seen, in terms of the previous discussion, as being reversed by comparison to the other two blocs. The negative power which the non-aligned nations possess is used by the elites to help build and strengthen a pseudo ideology which in a more normal (classical)

situation should itself be the basis of the movement and its power. In other words, the mobilized masses are present, but they are not mobilized as a result of some utopian ideology which has spurred them to action. The elites may be seen as trying to build the desire for economic and political improvement as a substitute for a true ideology. Their operations in the foreign affairs sphere are attempts to further these goals through the use of their negative form of power.

A form of power politics is being played by the non-aligned nations. They use their lack of actual power and responsibility as a lever against the real power and ideology of the other blocs to attain their ends. The conscious effort by the western and Communist blocs not to use obvious power to gain allies in the non-aligned bloc is what permits these nations to continue to operate in the manner they do. World opinion (which is at best a nebulous concept) also acts as a brake on the use of force by the two power blocs when dealing with the non-aligned bloc.

Therefore, within this third bloc the relative importance of ideology and power cannot be definitely determined since neither exist in the normal context. True, there is a substitute for both and these are interrelated, but their interrelation seems meaningless when considered apart from relations with the other blocs. When viewed along with the relations of the other blocs, a more concrete relation may become evident.

CONCLUSION

In the world today, there is an ideological and a power struggle in progress. The ideology of Communism versus that of Western capitalist

democracy. The battleground for this struggle is the emerging under-developed and non-developed countries of the Afro-Asian and Middle Eastern areas. The realization of the true nature of this struggle has been slow in emerging in the West. For a long time the West failed to see the in-applicability of its ideology (myth) to the conditions in the non-aligned countries. A second problem which the West faced in this area was the bad ideological image which it had as a result of past imperial operations in the non-aligned areas. The adaptive nature of the Communist ideology and their flexible power employment also heightened the disparity for the West which many of the non-aligned countries developed before the West became aware of the situation there.

The realization of this situation led the West to try and play down power politics and cleanse its ideological image. The results of this approach were not encouraging from the West's point of view. United States pressure for liquidation of the British and French empires and the loss of control of the Suez canal are examples of this approach and its results. In the short run (up to the present time) the results of this approach have been negative. At some future time, there may be some interest paid on this investment by the West, but that will remain to be seen.

One area where the West has been unable to effectively compete with the Communist ideology is that of the utopian idea of the future. While in the West and to a lesser degree in the Communist area itself, it seems to be agreed that no total utopia is just around the corner, there is still a certain appeal which this idea has for the starving oppressed masses of the emerging nations. The collective nature of the socio-economic

patterns among the natives in these areas has also been a strong factor in their acceptance of the Communist's socialist doctrine.

The failure of the West to appreciate the situation and the aims and goals of the non-aligned countries is difficult to understand in light of their specific enumeration at the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian States. The main fear of the non-aligned nations at that time was neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism from both the East and the West as a result of the bi-polar cold war struggle.

Lefever lists the following as the principal goals, values and strategies of the non-aligned bloc: enlightened national self-interest, as the most accurate name that describes their approach; an attempt to profit from the cold war; a superior feeling and more prestige than other small countries which fall within the spheres of either of the other two blocs; non-alignment as a way to permit the use of all available resources for internal purposes rather than using them to aid whichever larger nation they might become an ally of; staying out of struggles which are of no real interest to their country itself, as an ally can evade the risk of being the battleground for such a clash, i.e., the devastation in Korea after major powers fought there; the last goal which the non-aligned bloc has taken for itself is that of a potential balancer of power between the other two blocs, or at least the arbiter for the disputes between them.[35] This last goal seems some time off since the third bloc presently lacks the relative power to achieve such a position.

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35 Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism", Neutralism, ed. Wolfers, Washington, D.C., 1962, pp. 99-102

The so-called end of ideology in the West also has a counterpart in the non-aligned bloc. If we say that the end of ideology in the West is actually a general agreement on goals and values and thus results in a lack of ideological conflict, then we can see certain similarities in the third bloc. First, there is general agreement about the goals of the countries, i.e., freedom, national self-determination and self-rule, and economic and industrial progress. There is secondly, a somewhat vague, but general consensus about political methods, though the elites would probably not agree since that might weaken their power. Nevertheless, there is a pattern of mass party politics, elitist rule, socialist economic methods and finally a desire not to be truly neutral but actively non-aligned. This last approach will probably continue until enough actual power has been acquired by a country so that it can deal with others on a more or less equal level.

The elites are using the above goals like an ideology. It is the legitimating base for their internal authority and their tool for obtaining external prestige. (Growth of actual legitimate authority and prestige will see some change in the tone and use of the pseudo-ideology which is now the main crutch for their actions.) This policy of non-alignment has certain similarities with that which the United States followed in its early years before it had either real authority or prestige.

The interrelationship between ideology and power in world politics today is little changed from what it was been in the past. Ideology still serves as a base for power and as a justification for its use. What

has changed in the nature of ideology, or what is called ideology, and the manner of the employment of power. The end of ideology is here in many respects. The subsidence of claims of utopian social blueprints, the basic agreement on many goals and values, and the shifting emphasis in more immediate material betterment for the masses are all symptoms of this trend.

Myth, moral ethic or pseudo-ideology are now the justification for power usage and social action. Some observers see a danger in this present state of non-power politics. They feel that the end of ideology and the rise of economic competition, that has accompanied it, are actually clouding a situation which is really a power struggle but doesn't appear as such at present. Wolfers has pointed out that the ideological and economic competition presently in progress in the non-aligned countries, while shifting the emphasis away from power in the short run, may in the long run cause a much sharper re-emergence of power politics if one bloc should find itself loosing the non-power struggle and thereby ending up as a serious disadvantage relative to the other bloc power potential.[36] The reference here is to the West if the non-aligned bloc should eventually ally itself with the Communist bloc as a result of the present economic and ideological struggle taking place.

The relative importance of power and ideology may be summed up in the following points. Power in the Western and Communist blocs is similar in nature and generally equal in strength. There is less stress on

[36] Wolfers, Neutralism, Washington, D.C., 1961, pg. 47

theological mobilization is the goal than in the Communist bloc. This is mainly due to the differing nature of the ideological forces in these areas. The Communist bloc has a rationalist type of theology with an encouraging commitment to action. The West has a moral ethic or value-goal orientation whose commitment is to accommodate and reconcile social, political and economic pressures rather than to seek mass mobilization for systemic changes.

Due to the power stalemate and ideological conflict between the West and the Communist blocs, their struggle has shifted to the non-aligned line where, while espousing economic and ideological goals, both the East and West are striving to create an area in which the future ideological and value standards will be favorable to their own position. Since power gets its main backing from the ideology which gives it its authority, it may be concluded that what is actually going on today is a power struggle between the West and the Communists couched in ideological and economic terms.

The non-aligned countries have neither actual power nor classical theology. They are not strong enough either geographically or militarily to remain truly neutral. Their approach (strategy) is to take a middle course between the other two major blocs which will permit them to remain non-aligned and at the same time receive the material aid they need for internal economic and industrial progress. Success in this technique permits the ruling elites in the non-aligned countries to remain in power and thereby lead their countries towards their goal of material betterment and political independence.

In the final analysis then, power is still the main means and end in current world politics. Ideology supports power but in some instances seems to wane it as the basis of the struggle, but of nonetheless contends, international relations, like all politics is basically a struggle for power.[37]

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[37] Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 27

CHART 1 - STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONAL STAGES IN SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT
SPECTRUM OF CHANGE

Traditional	Transitional	Modern
Diffuse	Prismatic	Refracted
"Fused"		"Differentiated"
Value Pattern Variables:		
Ascription (birth-inherited position)		Achievement (ability and achievement)
Particularism (human differences)		Universalism (equality before the law)
Diffuseness (functional integration)		Specificity (separation functional)
Affective Neutrality		Affectivity
Collectivity Orientation (family-clan)		Self-orientation
Economic Pattern Variables		
Pre-newtonian sciences		Scientific technology
Peasant Agriculture (subsistence)		Farming (supportive agriculture)
Farm/Village domicile		Urban/suburban Agriculture
	Prismatic Characteristics	
	Bureaucratic formalism (legally specific but functionally diffuse)	
	Imperialist exploitation	
	Negativist elites	
	Personal ambivalence in decision making	
	Rural/urban discontinuity	
	Corruption	
Leadership		
Monarch-socially and religiously supported (Legitimate)	Totalitarian or Charismatic	Political-legal (legitimate by definition)
Basis of socio-political goals		
Religious orientation to life and nature	Ideological, "isms" begins and becomes with this stage	Rationally derived secular-class mass goals (end of Industrial)
NON-ALIGNED BLOC		BLOC CONSENSUS SET
	COMMUNIST BLOC	

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